Articles

This article presents an analysis of the process of formation of political subjectivity in modern Russian youth. At the beginning of the 21st century, under conditions of economic growth and the expansion of democratic freedoms, the political subjectivity of young people has becomes a topic of urgent public discourse. The desire of the Russian state to be an independent player in the international arena has led to a need to strengthen trust between the government and society. Building a constructive dialogue between the state and youth implies considering the younger generation as a signifi cant subject of socio-political relations. As a result of this analysis, the author concludes that the country has created appropriate mechanisms for constructive interaction between the authorities and young people, but due to changes in socio-political reality, they require regular modernization. Accordingly, the process of forming the political subjectivity of modern Russian youth is changing.

This article analyzes the role of social networks in the process of political socialization of modern young people. The author notes that Internet technologies and social media have had a signifi cant impact on the transformation of traditional forms of social and political communication. The hierarchical structure, where the key agents of socialization are the institutions of the family, schools, and traditional media, is being replaced by a network model with its inherent non-linear and non-hierarchical processes. The result of this has been the emergence of a network model of political socialization characterized by nonlinear processes, the strengthening of subject-subject relations, the introverted character of socialization and the predominance of horizontal relations between the participants of political socialization.

This article analyzes the eschatological basis of the communal (congregational) structure of representatives of pre-revolutionary Russian religious divergence: radical Old Believer priestless (bespopovskikh) interpretations on the one hand and intra-church mystical outgrowths — khlystovstvo (asceticism/fl agellation) and skopchestvo (castration) — on the other. The author assumes that all such divergences are largely based on the Russian pre-schismatic eschatological tradition, which postulates a special spiritual and political mission of the Tsar — bringing his people from the earthly reality to a heavenly one. Nevertheless, in the discourse of the radical bespopovites and inner-Church mystical sectarians, there is a cardinal substitution of eschatological aspirations. The idea of the unity of the people through the Church in the struggle for the triumph of the “Heavenly Jerusalem” is replaced in this discourse by the idea of a full disclosure of eschatological reality in small religious groups, each of which considers its “ship” as eschatological completeness led by “Christ the King.” Thus by considering the specifi cs of eschatological consciousness the article raises the problem of the specifi city of the monarchical self-consciousness of the pre-revolutionary Russian peasantry.

In this article the author attempts to determine the place and role of Buddhism in the process of building a regional political order in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by identifying key characteristics that refl ect the specifi cs of the East Asian region. Contrary to the conventional belief of the universality of state and legal institutions — which, according to Francis Fukuyama’s prediction, was to take place with “all human societies” — the region under study demonstrated its own value-ideological attitudes. Buddhism was never perceived by the people of East Asia exclusively from a religious, sacral position. It was a way of thinking and living that undoubtedly fi gured in the development of state institutions as well. Although in a closer study of the principles of power, place, and the role of the head of state and his relationship with the Sangha diff ered in the tradition of Hinayana (South-East Asia) and Mahayana (North-East Asia), the author provides a set of characteristics typical of any existing current in Buddhism which played a decisive role in the question of its infl uence on the regional political order. An important feature of the region was the presence of predominantly nationstates, which meant that religion played a signifi cant role in forming the identity of the subjects of each state, who felt themselves guardians of ancient traditions, culture and language. Buddhism allowed the peoples of the region to be perceived as part of a whole, and above all, by these peoples themselves — a concept that Japan took advantage of by declaring an ambitious project to create a “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Playing on cultural and spiritual contradictions and the opposition of “European” to “Asian,” the Japanese managed to achieve signifi cant success in implementing this project in a short period of time, which was greatly facilitated by Buddhism itself and its most active minions both in Japan and on the continent.

This article is devoted to the study of the formation of radical Islamic movements in Central Asia in the post-Soviet period. The authors analyze the factors of radicalization of Islam in the Central Asian region in the late 20th — early 21st centuries using the examples of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), whose activities are currently prohibited by the leadership of the republics. One of the main reasons for the growing infl uence of radical Islamists is the extremely diffi cult socio-economic situation in Central Asia during this period. Despite the “Salafi trend” in the Islamic world, especially among radicals, the Wahhabi leadership of the IMU and the IRPT were unable fi nd support in the eyes of the majority of the population of the post-Soviet republics, and the status quo continues in the region. However, the dominance of Sufi s in the countries of Central Asia and the marginalization of leading Islamic groups does not mean that there are no prerequisites for the development of religious extremism — which could pose a threat to both the security of Russia itself and the allies of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

This article presents an empirical study of the collective memory of the Civil War in Russia based on the content of online commentaries. Images of the past are considered as resulting from the competition between mnemonic actors and narratives constructed by them in the public space. Online memory acts as a medium for ideological and political disputes and is encoded by the current media agenda. The structural characteristics of the “red” and “white” narratives of the Civil war are described. A conclusion is drawn as to the symmetrical organization of the opposing versions of the Civil War and the special role of the narrative of “national treason” in the construction of online memory. One of the main obstacles to reconciliation, the author maintains, is the dominance of moral discourse in the judgments of members of the online community.

This article analyzes the theory and practice of using mediation technologies for managing (resolving) modern environmental confl icts. The main characteristics of mediation, the necessary conditions for its application, types of mediation, and the diff erences between environmental mediation and other types of mediation are highlighted. Using various examples of mediation in environmental confl icts in the United States since the 1970s, the author examines the principles of choosing a mediator, the mediator’s role in the confl ict resolution process, the advantages and disadvantages of using mediation from the point of view of various participants in environmental confl icts, the political aspects of using mediation to resolve environmental confl icts and its possibilities and limitations.

This article off ers an analysis of “Bourgeois Happiness” and “Molotov,” two novels by Nikolai Pomyalovsky that present an artistic conceptualization of the formation of the consciousnes of the raznochintsy class. The heroes of Pomyalovsky’s novels, Yegor Molotov and Mikhail Cherevanin, personify two strategies for the behavior of representatives of the new class. Molotov integrates into the existing structure of society and comes to creatie a bourgeois “idyll.” Cherevanin refuses to integrate, becomes a pessimist and chooses a path of self-destruction. The search for a mission by both heroes ends in failure. Molotov and Cherevanin do not have faith in their own strength and lack a clear understanding of what to do. But the artistic conceptualization of such searches undertaken by Pomyalovsky had a greater socio-political signifi cance. Pomyalovsky began the work to be completed by Nikolai Chernyshevsky, another well-known writer of the raznochintsy class. And the achievment of Chernyshevsky was that he united the disparate parts of the unformed raznochintsy consciousness in a comprehensive doctrine that he presented in the novel “What Is to Be Done?”

This article is devoted to the prospect of using collective memory as a resource of soft power. The author notes that the importance of this use of collective memory is associated not only with purposeful social activity, but also with a special sociolinguistic matrix. The article sets out the main political and philosophical ideas that retinterpret the power practices underlying the use of collective memory in soft power strategies. Scaling up to the level of international relationships, collective memory is associated with soft power as one of the eff ective tools for implementing strategies that mitigate the eff ects of overt or covert interstate confl icts. Collective memory as a separate tool of soft power is deployed in various practices of memorial diplomacy, although its use to improve interstate relations and reconciliation of various historical narratives in the world is not exhaustive. The aims, actors and forms of memorial diplomacy are noted by the authors, as are the main scenarios of its implementation: 1) for overcoming the negative and tragic experience of the past; and 2) to update narrative strategies in territories with pronounced narrative inconsistency.