Batishchev Roman Yurievich

The article analyses the use of video games with a historical plot to develop or erode the ingroup favoritism of the Russian population and its national and state identity. The methodology of the work is based on a combination of elements of comparative and structural analysis with the analysis of the secondary sociological research literature. Collecting and analysing data from recent opinion polls, the author proves that in the current situation the image of the present, the future and “significant others” do not represent the source of the development of ingroup favoritism among Russian youth, a fact that in the long run threatens the stability of identity of citizens of the Russian Federation. Although the results of the opinion polls indicate the possibility of exploiting the image of the past in order to develop ingroup favoritism, the younger generation demonstrates a rejection of traditional forms of narratives of memories. Accordingly, video games seem to be the most promising resource for constructing the image of the past. However, from a commercial point of view, the implementation of these projects is fraught with high risks, indicating the need for state intervention and support. The article suggests that in intervening in this sector the state should take into account the shortcomings identified in the system of state sponsorship of commercial filmmaking industry, as one of the closest sectors capable of forming a positive national-state identity.

The article defines the specifics of the actor approach in the context of the study of memory policy, and also analyzes the specifics of political parties as mnemonic actors. The collapse of the Soviet Union is used as a historical event demonstrating the difference between the symbolic trajectories of political parties. Based on an analysis of party election programs, the dynamics of ideas about the collapse of the Soviet Union among the parliamentary parties of the VIII convocation was analyzed. The LDPR and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation turned out to be the most active in terms of the implementation of the memory policy, while the rest of the parties showed a weak interest in updating and interpreting the collapse of the Soviet Union as an element of the party’s memory policy. Such differences may be related to the desire of parties to increase their political status by including their own history in a more significant political context, so those parties that arose in the 2000s are not interested in the symbolic use and appropriation of images of the Soviet past. In addition, it is worth considering generational changes in party elites, due to which the traumaticity of perception of the collapse of the Soviet Union gradually decreases as changes in the composition of governing bodies.