Anikin Daniil Alexandrovich

The article looks at the issue of the role of political actors as subjects of historical responsibility. Based on the communicative approach elaborated by H. Arendt, the authors provide a distinction between the event, which is the subject of historical responsibility, and the act of establishing responsibility in the public space. It is suggested that such an act can be only the result of democratic procedures. Consequently, historical responsibility as a social phenomenon is possible only in a democratic society, even though attempts to establish it may take place under non-democratic regimes. Furthermore, the article claims that the case of Germany as an example of the establishment of negative responsibility cannot be characterized as universal. Indeed, it is also possible to speak about the establishment of positive responsibility as a duty of the community to preserve the memory not of guilt, but of the merits of the collective subject. Therefore, as a rule, the affi rmation of positive responsibility takes place in a context following a political crisis and the consolidation of moral resentment. An example of the constitution of a positive responsibility is the cult of victory in the Great Patriotic War within the Russian society of the 1990s, which followed the experience of the collapse of the USSR and the need for moral compensation. The characteristic features of historical responsibility include performativity, representativeness, normativity, manipulativeness. The role of political actors is not qualitatively shaping diff erent forms of responsibility, but rather aff ecting the specifi c procedures that consolidate it.

The article defines the specifics of the actor approach in the context of the study of memory policy, and also analyzes the specifics of political parties as mnemonic actors. The collapse of the Soviet Union is used as a historical event demonstrating the difference between the symbolic trajectories of political parties. Based on an analysis of party election programs, the dynamics of ideas about the collapse of the Soviet Union among the parliamentary parties of the VIII convocation was analyzed. The LDPR and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation turned out to be the most active in terms of the implementation of the memory policy, while the rest of the parties showed a weak interest in updating and interpreting the collapse of the Soviet Union as an element of the party’s memory policy. Such differences may be related to the desire of parties to increase their political status by including their own history in a more significant political context, so those parties that arose in the 2000s are not interested in the symbolic use and appropriation of images of the Soviet past. In addition, it is worth considering generational changes in party elites, due to which the traumaticity of perception of the collapse of the Soviet Union gradually decreases as changes in the composition of governing bodies.

The article explores the problem of transforming military commemorative practices in a contemporary Russian school with the help of a comparative analysis of Soviet practices related to the Great Patriotic War and new ways to perpetuate participants in a special military operation. There are three types of commemorative practices that updated the memory of the Great Patriotic War in the educational space of the Soviet school: nominative and organizational (renaming educational institutions, installing memorial plaques), museum and exhibition (expositions in school museums) and ceremonial (inviting veterans to conduct open lessons). Current commemorations related to the perpetuation of a special military operation rely on those symbolic practices that were developed in Soviet society. At the same time, they do not replace, but prolong existing practices, forming the interpretation of a special military operation as a logical continuation of the struggle of the Soviet people against Nazism. The difficult point of current military commemorations remains the question how memory of local conflicts (for example, the war in Afghanistan) can relate to the indicated continuity of commemorative practices as well as how to define the criteria for the selection of those characters and events that need commemoration.

The article analyzes postcolonial theory in terms of risk of its use as a tool of cancel culture in relation to Russia. The shortcomings of postcolonial optics of research related to the presumption of the moral superiority of colonies in relation to metropole, as well as the use of Western European discourse to build an alternative colonial identity, are justified. Methodologically, it is important to distinguish postcolonialism as an academic theory and decolonization as a form of social activism, but these shortcomings lead to the fact that the actual difference between theory and ideological construction can practically disappear.
The example of a number of Western European concepts reveals the mechanism for transferring the model of maritime colonial empires to Russian history, which opens up scope for ideological speculation. The maximum expression of post-colonial nationalism in the post-Soviet space is the building of an equivalence chain between the Russian Empire — the USSR — the Russian Federation, as a continuous “imperial oppression” of subject peoples. In this case, postcolonialism becomes a tool for forming the negative appearance of the present and past of Russia. For a productive study of the processes of colonization and decolonization, especially from the point of view of comparative political science, an analysis of the concept of “empire” is proposed to identify its essential characteristics and cultural characteristics of manifestation.