Articles

This article treats the study of the theoretical foundations of the use of social technologies in foreign policy, describing various stages in the development of social technologies as well as their role in the foreign policy of modern states in achieving a leading position in the international arena. The author maintains that in the context of a changing world order, states seeking to strengthen their positions in the world actively use various forms and methods of humanitarian infl uence on the populations and political leadership of opposing states. Modern states employ various forms and types of social technologies, the article continues, for expansion in various areas of geopolitical space: territorial, economic, informational, social, cultural and ideological. The author further outlines the various forms and means of applying social technologies in foreign policy that are included in the arsenal of non-military methods for implementing a nation’s foreign policy objectives.

Rivalry between centers of power, the rise of extremism, unceremonious attempts at interference in the internal aff airs of sovereign states, the build-up of military preparations — all these and various other challenges and threats are putting international law, international mechanisms and the world order through very serious tests that will last for decades. Actions to undermine the global and national security of Russia are based on the economic, fi nancial, informational and military domination of the United States and on a broad system of alliances and international economic and fi nancial organizations operating under the auspices of Washington. To address these problems, “soft power” technologies can be skillfully applied in each of the spheres of state management: administrative, political, socioeconomic, cultural and ideological. Strategic culture is a unique tool to counter rivals and promote our own values in the conduct of foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

This article presents an analysis of the activities of Polish “think tanks” that specialize in the study of problems of information warfare, propaganda, misinformation and cybersecurity, drawing attention to the constant or periodic fulfi llment by these organizations of an unacknowledged function. The author concludes that the organizations under consideration act as both analytical centers and “infl uence groups” that promote specifi c content in the interests of the customer and act as tools for the implementation of information warfare. Taking into account the theory and practice of information wars, the article proposes to distinguish a special type of “think tank” involved in the process of international information warfare: the “dual-use” analytical center. The recognition of this type of organization will allow us to separate “think tanks” that act as scholarly research and analytical centers from structures fully or partially engaged in the actual processes of information confrontation between states in international relations.

In this article the authors address the problem of a declining level of public support for the Eurasian integration processes in Belarus — the country that has assumed the chairmanship in the Eurasian Economic Union (EUAU) in February 2020. Among external reasons for this, the activity of Western non-profi t organizations and think-tanks is cited. Domestic reasons include an insuffi cient presence of a pro-Eurasian agenda in the Belarusian media and the small number of pro- Eurasian non-profi t organizations that popularize integration processes at the level of civil society. The authors compare the work of non-profi t organizations in the EAEU countries, coming to the conclusion that in Belarus the situation is complicated by the uncertain legal status of volunteers. In conclusion, the article off ers recommendations for raising public support for Eurasian integration. For example, an increase in the number of non-profi t organizations and foundations to promote Eurasian integration could contribute to a positive attitude towards the EAEU in Belarus. In addition, the authors maintain, the necessity of adopting a law on the status of volunteers in the Republic of Belarus is well-founded.

This article discusses the signifi cance and developmental features of contemporary social movements, emphasizing their role in the modernization of society. Particular attention is paid to the process of social self-organization of social movements as a phenomenon that allows us to understand the basic defi ning framework of their development, the principles of societal functioning, and more clearly defi ne the role of the individual in the historical process. From a political science perspective, civil society is considered as not just a specifi c legal and economic form of interaction between society and the state, but as a vast and multifaceted space for mutual infl uence and interaction of social movements. Self-organization of social movements is seen as a natural and universal process that permits the resolution of active problems and maintains the stability of communities, forming and transforming structures for overcoming crisis phenomena in a timely manner. The article further presents an attempt to form a political science understanding of the theory of self-organization through the theory of resource mobilization (John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald), Per Bak’s theory of self-organized criticality, Neil Smelser’s value added theory, and the use of the network approach and framework analysis. The author closes by drawing a conclusion as to the importance of the process of self-organization of social movements in the political process.

This article deals with one of the forms of new regionalism in Asia — trans- Asian politics. The author examines in detail how trans-Asian political structures are formed on the basis of liberal ideology. The study is based on materials from the Asian media; its research methodology draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of political capital. The chronological framework of the study extends over the first twenty years of the 21st century, during which the infl uence of liberal ideology shaped a new regionalism. At the present stage, the structures that perform the representative function of trans-Asian political integration describe their ideology in marked contrast to the ideologies of both China and Russia. Having close ties with American and European institutions, they form a special generation of political organizations and politicians focused on actions both within their own national states and outside their borders. In the future, this may become a serious challenge to the internal political stability of the regional hegemonic powers. As the liberal vector of trans-Asian politics strengthens, the article concludes. the likelihood of developing intra-regional structures oriented towards conservative values and ideas increases.

This article examines the ideology of the extreme right-wing parties in modern Europe in the novel context of the conceptual framework of the so-called neo-nationalism (or new nationalism) now being actively developed in modern political science. This concept is intended to become a new explanatory category, contributing to a better understanding of the political processes taking place in Europe and of the European far-right movement itself. The relevance of this kind of research is stipulated by the fact that the role of nationalism in the ideology of the far-right parties remains controversial and relatively poorly studied. The aim of the study was to identify the characteristic features of the ideology of far-right parties that can be described as nationalistic. The author reconstructs the ideological profi les of far-right parties, determines the share of the nationalism component in each and analyzes its structure. As a result of the study, a ranking of parties according to their degree of nationalism can be composed and a general conclusion drawn as to the possibility of their typologization in this quality.

The changes that took place in 2014 in relations with the collective West after the coup in Ukraine marked a paradigm shift and put an end to hopes for the Westernization of our country. A reference to the period of the early 1990s is of interest here because it was then that the foundations of the political course of post-Soviet Russia were laid, including in the fi eld of constitutional creation. The author off ers his version of the periodization of the development of the Russian Constitution over 1990-1993 and the constitutional reform in general in an eff ort to fi ll the existing lacuna in the study of the topic. Each of the stages receives a separate article that discusses key events and trends. This article is the fi rst of three and covers the time from June 1990 to December 1991. This period is marked by a genuine search for an alternative to the Soviet system and the formation of a new model of power in the republic headed by a strong president. Although this construction was considered temporary at the end of 1991, it was legitimized in the Russian Constitution adopted on December 12, 1993. During this period, further, problems arose that later resulted in the “crisis of dual power,” the growth of separatism, and so on. The article introduces new sources into scholarly circulation, including interviews with participants in the events of the years under study.

In this article’s second part, the authors consider the results of the activities of the predecessor of English (insular) Protestantism, the theologian and philosopher William Ockham, who at the beginning of the 14th century formulated the basic postulates of a political phenomenon later to be called British imperialism. Occamism gave rise to individualistic liberalism as the foundation of bourgeois law; the idea of “human rights”; voluntarism as the primacy of will over reason; and the emphasis on empirical knowledge as a belief in progress and as a principle of utilitarianism. The authors describe the programming infl uence of Occamism on the formation of the mental foundations of the ruling estates and demonstrate the mental and political dynamics of British elites in the period of national history before the Reformation of 1534. The sustaining mental references of the British elites — including individualism, voluntarism, pluralism, skepticism, relativism, messianism, political expansionism — are also discussed. Finally, the structure of the mental-evaluational resource base of the elites is presented, featuring nominalism, imperial-patriotic liberalism and liberal law, conservatism, traditionalism, the law of the strong, hegemonism and the awareness of exclusiveness.