The Democratization Trap: Linkages Between Politicians And Voters In Young Democracies

Abstract

This article introduces the concept of the “democratization trap.” Democratization can be considered as a process with an autonomous logic of development that cannot be fully grasped by standard “actor-oriented” and “structural” approaches. The autonomous logic of democratization is formalized via a game-theoretical model with “politicians” and “voters” as players. They interact under conditions that are inherent to all young democracies. The model predicts that certain types of linkages between politicians and voters emerge endogenously; the emphasis is on the observation that these types of linkages are defective in the context of “liberal democracy.” Moreover, these defective linkages may arise even if elections are free, honest and competitive. Empirical evidence underpins the main predictions of the model. The concept of the “democratization trap” may have several interesting implications which call for further research, from factors that cause democratic transitions to “ freeze up” to contradictions between “liberal” and “democratic” components of liberal democracy.

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