Articles

Thomas Spence (1750–1814) was one of the originators of British radicalism in the mid-18th century. His political views were at base an ideology for landless peasants and workers who suffered oppression during the transition from manufactory to factory production. Spence’s program of reforms was first voiced at a meeting of the Newcastle Philosophical Society on November 8, 1775. In the pamphlet “Human Rights,” Spence advocated abolition of the private ownership of land and its transfer to parish communities. Commonly-owned land and the parish as an administrative formation were the requisite components of Spence’s ideal society, and it was precisely such a society that the radical described in his utopian works. Spence’s political ideas had a significant impact on the development of popular radicalism and the labor movement in England from the second half of the 18th century up to the early Chartist period. The pamphlet “Human Rights” appears here in Russian for the first time.

This article is devoted to the social and political heritage of the English radical Thomas Spence (1750–1814), who had a significant influence on the development of popular radicalism and the labor movement in England from the second half of the 18th century to the period of early Chartism. Spence’s political doctrine is considered through examples from his various works, but particular attention is paid to a lecture that gained wide popularity under the title “Human Rights.” In it, Spence for the first time summed up his political program, which can be reduced to the following thesis: if natural law represents an equal opportunity for everyone to take all that nature gives, then the land must also be the common property of the people living on it. To implement this principle, Spence proposed to transfer all land ownership to the management of parishes, which were to provide their members with land and oversee a fair distribution of income from the leasing of land.

This study maintains that the events in the South Caucasus after the February Revolution developed under the influence of several factors, among them the desire for political freedoms and autonomy, the presence of three governments, confusion and chaos in the region and the struggle of the two competing blocs for access to the resources of the region. The main goals of the Entente countries were not to restore the overthrown Provisional government, but to overthrow the Bolshevik government, break up Russia and to gain access to its natural resources. The Entente countries, strengthening their military, political and economic presence in the South Caucasus and cooperating with anti-Bolshevik elements, sought to ensure control over the Caspian and Baku ports. Thus, these countries had to control not only the Baku oil trade, but all routes leading to Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.

This article is devoted to the problem of the legitimacy of revolution in general and of the Russian revolution of 1917 in particular. The problem of legitimacy of revolutions may be divided into two components: first, the legitimacy of anti-government protests; and secondly, the legitimacy of the new revolutionary government. The second point divides society into uncompromising camps, which happened to the government of the Jacobins in the French Revolution and to the government of Bolsheviks after Russia’s October Revolution — and still divides Russian society today. The Russian revolution of 1917, in its February and October segments, based its legitimacy — as had all its predecessors — on the existing legislature and on the right of force. The particular feature of the Russian Revolution was that the extreme left, represented by the Bolsheviks, was able, unlike the Jacobins, to retain power thanks to sufficient societal support. Thus they were able to win the civil war, first, and secondly, to take over a society that was exhausted after a prolonged period of disorder and which, in its majority, was eager for peace — and therefore either accepted the new power or was prepared to tolderate it.

This article addresses the underlying socio-economic causes of “color revolutions” and the consequences that states have had to endure after coups d’état had been effectively carried out on their territory. The authors point out that in reality unresolved domestic problems — first of all economic — do not constitute a determining factor in the implementation of a “color revolution” scenario: most of the “color revolutions” took place in states that showed sustained economic growth rather than in countries with backward economies. After the coups, those countries saw a decline in most key macroeconomic indicators. The authors conclude that in the case of the post-Soviet space, the series of “color revolutions” came about as a result of a synthesis of interests pursued by national financial and industrial groups (oligarchs) and the interests of external actors who could achieve their geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives by dismantling “inconvenient” political regimes.